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Abstract 
Focusing upon scapegoating in post-crash Ireland, this article considers a pervasive 
political process that is protective of powerful interests and the status quo following 
the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. Drawing from group conflict theory and framing 
analysis as part of a broader critical realist take on society, we consider how blame 
has been placed on myriad targets, ranging from a collective ‘we who went a bit mad 
with borrowing’ to more specific groups such as public sector workers, the 
unemployed, single mothers and immigrants. In conclusion, we underscore the need 
for sociology to assert its relevance by challenging such processes and defend civil 
society in a capitalist world-system that is in structural crisis. 
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From the (Ir)Relevance of Sociology to Scapegoating in Context 
Cuts, framed as ‘savings’, constitute the leitmotif of leading politicians in Ireland, the 
poster child for austerity in the European Union (EU). Accordingly, as sociologists 
residing in Ireland, we were encouraged to see calls for papers on the global crisis 
for this special issue of Sociology. While concerns about our discipline’s general 
myopia and possible irrelevance were articulated in the literature on the cusp of the 
global financial crisis (GFC) - captured by the question ‘whither sociology?’ (Lenzer 
2007) – we feel it is the task and promise of sociology to advance critical, reflexive 
knowledge in these challenging times. Such a sociology, as Burawoy (2005) 
contends, not only has disciplinary but also public relevance in terms of addressing 
the question ‘what sort of society do we wish to live in?’ It is a question that has 
increasing resonance. Note, for example, the 2012 British Sociological Association 
(BSA) conference ‘Sociology in an Age of Austerity’, the BSA ‘Activism in Sociology 
Forum’ and the recent workshop ‘Social and Political Critique in an Age of 
Austerity’ held by the BSA Digital Sociology Study Group in 2014.     
  
In this paper we aim to critique all-too-common efforts to construct easy scapegoats 
under conditions of crisis and austerity. The word scapegoating is derived from 
religious practice aimed at taking away the sins of the world (Frazer 1919). In biblical 
stories it involved the ritual transfer of evil to a live goat, from which the process 
gets its name (Girard 1989). Anthropologists have observed this ‘transference of evil’ 
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across a range of cultures, involving animals, inanimate objects and, all too often 
people (or groups of people). In certain regions, such as in parts of sub-Saharan 
Africa where witchcraft is still practiced, those labelled as witches are killed with the 
view to warding off misfortune (Miguel 2005). Significantly, the number of such 
killings tends to increase when a calamitous situation (i.e. a drought or disease) 
suddenly hits a community (Miguel 2005). Yet, in contexts such as contemporary 
USA where scapegoating is increasingly removed from community, religion and 
physical violence, ‘it becomes more widespread but simultaneously shallower’ so 
that in its secular, political sense, ‘scapegoating today can still generate hatred, but it 
is now directed toward a plethora of transitory victims’ (Brown and Stivers 1998: 
716). A recent example, as seen in Europe under conditions of crisis, is provided in 
the documentary ‘”Ruins – Chronicle of an HIV witch-hunt”, which describes and 
narrates how the Greek government went on a populist, scaremongering and 
scapegoating campaign against HIV patients’ who all happened to be women 
(Eberhardt 2013). Our discussion on political (secular) scapegoating focuses on post-
Celtic Tiger Ireland wherein the GFC and reactions to this are exerting a corrosive 
effect on the larger society (Allen 2009, McDonough and Loughrey 2009). Befitting 
calls for this special of Sociology on the global crisis, our paper, is also intended to 
have wider resonance when interrogating an interconnected world-system 
(Wallerstein 1999, 2011) of exploitative class relations and ideological fictions where 
it is not only Ireland’s (new) poor and marginalised who risk vilification.  
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We anticipate most readers will have at least some familiarity with the tale of the 
Celtic Tiger economy (circa 1995 to 2008). To quote a well-known Irish journalist, the 
rise and fall of Ireland’s economy makes ‘Icarus look boringly stable’ (O’Toole 2010: 
10). Ireland’s economy experienced an unprecedented boom before it suddenly 
imploded as the US financial crisis went global. We would add that Ireland’s ‘new 
found prosperity’ was never widely shared; indeed, it was realised in the context of 
increasing inequality in what is one of the most unequal members of the EU 
(McDonough and Loughrey 2009; for a discussion on growing inequality in Britain 
under finance capital, see Scambler 2012). The Celtic Tiger era should thus be 
understood as a speculative boom within a broader ‘bubble economy’ that has 
proliferated in recent decades (Hudson 2010, Monaghan and O’Flynn 2013): a brief 
period in history when Ireland, which has always had a weak indigenous economy 
(Allen 2009), rode on the coat-tails of far more powerful global players. The ‘illusory’ 
status of Ireland’s economic miracle (see Share and Corcoran 2010) was effectively 
exposed as finance capitalism crashed in 2008, culminating in massive bank bailouts 
and socialised losses. In 2008 the Irish government put up ‘the entire Irish State as 
collateral for the crushing liabilities of six private banks ... approximately €400 billion 
in leveraged loans’ (McCabe 2011: 169). In 2010 these bailouts resulted in a sovereign 
debt crisis and an €85bn conditional loan from the EU and European Central Bank, 
funded, in no small part, by the country’s own pension reserves. i  Accordingly, 
Ireland became the most burdened in the EU by bank debts: Eurostat data (2007 to 
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2011) reveal that while the bank bailouts in the EU averaged €192 per capita, in 
Ireland it was a staggering €8,981 (Taft 2013a).  
 
A coalition government, comprising Fine Gael and Labour, was elected in 2011 and 
immediately reneged on election promises such as ‘burning bank bond holders’. 
Accordingly, we would argue that the current Irish government is administering a 
neoliberal (class) project of accumulation by dispossession (Harvey 2005), where 
‘savings’ (cuts to social welfare, incomes and basic public services) are accompanied 
by increases in levies and taxation that were previously deemed ‘obscene’ by these 
very same politicians when in opposition (see Kerrigan 2012). Of course, as stated by 
Weber over a century ago with reference to ‘all economic storm warnings’, it is 
‘laughable’ to assume democracy and freedom could survive under the ‘domination’ 
of ‘high capitalism’ (cited by Lenzer 2007: 499; see also Walby, 2013, on democracy 
and finance). With this domestic situation and the GFC as our backdrop, we are 
concerned with the processes that facilitate the channelling of blame away from 
more powerful groups towards subordinated and marginalised groups. 
Accordingly, we are concerned with scapegoating as it relates to and facilitates the 
on-going redistribution of wealth as efforts are made to redirect the public gaze 
towards myriad groups who are vilified for their alleged offences. Thus we argue 
that in this instance scapegoating is a deeply political process which occludes critical 
attention that might otherwise challenge deeper structural relations, figurations and 
logics that reproduce Irish capitalism (Allen 2009, McCabe 2011).  
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Theoretical framework 
Acknowledging what Scambler (2010) calls meta-construction or ‘meta-reflection’, 
where use is made of existing substantive theories and data, our work goes beyond 
the typically micro-level empirical concerns of cultural anthropology and 
interpretivist sociology. At a meta-theoretical level we favour critical realism (CR) 
(e.g. Frauley and Pearce 2007), which is gaining prominence in sub-areas of our 
discipline and sociology more generally. While Williams (2003) outlines the 
principles of CR for social theorists of health, Scambler (2012) has directed such 
concerns to the broader sociological community. Scambler explains that CRs 
interrogate stratified reality comprising real generative mechanisms such as gender, 
social class and command (intransitive mechanisms which are mind independent 
and have causal efficacy). Accordingly, in avoiding the relativising twists and turns 
of postructuralist theorising (Williams 2003), CRs seek to advance a more reflexive, 
critical and politicised sociology that is cautious (knowledge is fallible) but which 
aims to have real world relevance. CR, with its antecedents in the classics (e.g. 
Marx’s writings), makes sense to us, and, as with Williams (2003), we view much 
sociological work as CR even if authors do not explicitly identify as such.  
 
Frauley and Pearce (2007: 5) advise that CR ‘is compatible with a number of 
substantive theoretical positions’. Besides sociocultural analyses of scapegoating 
which we will draw from (e.g. Brown and Stivers 1998), we consider the group 
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conflict theoretical framework, which has its antecedents in Blumer’s (1958) work, to 
have value. Such a theory argues that how members of out-groups (i.e. those 
excluded from the dominant means of symbolic reproduction and public opinion 
formation) are portrayed/perceived is dependent on whether they pose a substantial 
threat to the in-group’s advantageous circumstances, including their ‘requirements’ 
for resources (McLaren and Johnson 2004). Group conflict research conducted in the 
USA and Europe is informative insofar as it identifies group-interests and resource 
competition as key reasons for hostility towards other groups in society (Bobo 1988, 
Espenshade and Hempstead 1996). ‘Members of the ingroup… enjoy(ed) privileged 
access to resources such as jobs, power, money, welfare benefits’ etc., which if 
‘challenged by competition’ for these resources from ’outgroups’ sees prejudice 
enacted, as a mechanism to keep a grip on the status quo (Gibson 2002: 72, cited in 
McLaren and Johnson 2004: 713). Accordingly, group conflict theory, ‘although 
originally envisioned as a theory of prejudice and discrimination, also informs a 
wealth of research on formal social control’ (King and Wheelcock 2007: 1255). We 
would suggest that the theory also provides a useful framework for understanding 
scapegoating in Ireland, and, in acknowledging larger systemic concerns, the 
subordination of the nation itself in a capitalist world-system (Wallerstein 1999).  
 
Finally, when reflecting on scapegoating in post-crash Ireland, we will use framing 
analysis, a form of content analysis that sociologists have usefully applied to various 
cultural artefacts such as media content and policy documents. Indeed, framing 
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analysis serves as the basis for media studies in Ireland which explore the vilification 
of public sector workers (Murphy 2010, Marron 2011, 2012), as well as how the 
powerful ‘ideologically constructed’ the crash more generally in an attempt to 
‘repair the damage that the crisis has done to their interests’ (McCullagh 2010: 38). 
Such an approach, similar to group conflict theory, is useful insofar as it sensitises us 
to how claims makers seek to make their definition of reality prevail over competing 
versions. In qualifying our explicitly evaluative (CR) approach, with its emphasis on 
ontological matters (e.g. underlying intransitive structures), we do not believe the 
world is reducible to meaning and discourse (Williams 2003), or socially constructed 
frames. At the same time, CR is compatible with the sociological study of 
discourse/frames and an appreciation of the power of language in shaping social 
realities that are real in their effects. In the ensuing critique we will therefore draw 
from framing analysis to show how the dominant in-group construct and 
marginalise the out-group, even when the latter are the statistical majority. In short, 
framing analysis complements our use of group conflict theory and the 
emancipatory impulse of CR to explore the politicised/diversionary process of 
stigmatising myriad targets in a larger unequal system of structured, hierarchical 
social relations. Our approach is intended to illuminate the powerful role of the 
‘framers’ (members of the privileged in-group) and the part they play in moulding 
social discourses and orchestrating the public agenda in an attempt to control the 
public thought process (Breen 2007, cited in Marron 2011: 24). Such a discussion, we 
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think, is timely and necessary especially in light of recent research demonstrating 
that the Irish mass media are relentless cheerleaders for austerity (Mercille 2013).  
 
Oppression, Values and Ideologies: Shaping Perception, Framing Blame 
We now turn our attention to the scapegoating of various groups - the oppressive 
‘framing’ of myriad targets - in hegemonic political discourse and contemporary 
Irish mainstream media. As we will argue, scapegoating has been a convenient tool 
as the power elite sought ‘ideological retrenchment’ and explanations for the crisis 
that were ‘more congruent with the interests of the golden circle of bankers, business 
and government’ (McCullagh 2010: 44). Based on such a reading, the political 
decision to socialise private banking debt and subsequent austerity policies are 
rooted in hegemonic class interests and neoliberal ideology, which have sought to 
‘frame and shape individuals’ perceptions and preferences so as to pre-empt 
challenges to the status quo’ (Glasberg and Shannon 2011: 48). In that regard, the 
‘conflict frame’ emerges in hegemonic discourse to divert attention away from the 
choices made within the political economy and towards some other aspect of social 
life, while the ‘responsibility frame’ is used to ‘reveal’ those who are ‘really’ (sic) 
responsible for our social ills (d’Heaenens and de Lange 2001). Given the scale of 
social suffering currently being imposed on various sections of Irish society (see 
Browne 2014) it is no surprise to see stark examples of both frames in circulation. 
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To illustrate the use of such frames, we critique a number of dominant discourses: 
‘we were all to blame’, the ‘inefficient’ public service, and welfare ‘fraud’. These 
discourses figure in the scapegoating of (1) the whole population of Ireland (an 
obfuscating ‘we’ that supposedly democratises blame and thus responsibility for 
repaying banks’ debts), alongside more specific ‘drains’ on the system, such as (2) 
unionised public sector workers whose interests are allegedly antagonistic to the 
valorised private sector, and (3) recipients of social welfare, including: the 
unemployed who putatively eschew work as a ‘lifestyle choice’, single mothers who 
ostensibly have children with multiple fathers, and immigrants who reportedly fly 
into the country to claim benefits before departing. Brief reference is also made 
towards the end of our paper to the scapegoating of bankers, the largest recipients of 
state welfare at a time when evidence of their deceptive practices has been coming to 
light. As a caveat, informed critique also appears within mainstream media (e.g. 
Browne 2012) and we note such commentary below, though the aforementioned 
discourses remain hegemonic in the contested process of framing and scapegoating.  
 
Democratising Blame: ‘We All Partied’ 
In the early stages of the economic crash it was difficult for the power elite to deflect 
blame away from themselves. According to McCullagh (2010), the crisis was 
‘accidental’ insofar as the powerful were unprepared with ready explanations. And, 
as details of links between a ‘golden circle’ of politicians, bankers and property 
developers began to surface alongside data on the anatomy of the crisis, space was 
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created for alternative and critical explanations to be publicly aired. For example, as 
discussed by Ó Riain (2010: 30-1), between 1998 and 2007, under the sway of 
government policy ‘strongly predicated on neoliberal principles’, bank lending 
increased almost five-fold with 67 per cent of this increased lending channelled into 
property. However, rather than offering a sober and informed assessment of what 
fuelled Ireland’s crash, or what could have mitigated it (e.g. the need for far greater 
investment in the productive sector rather than speculative lending, subsidised 
courtesy of a large government cut in capital gains tax) (p. 30-1), the process of 
scapegoating began in earnest, with politicians, the business community and 
mainstream media working to spread the blame as widely as possible.  
 
In September 2008, during a national radio interview, the then Minister for Finance, 
Brian Lenihan, stated ‘we decided as a people, collectively, to have this property 
boom’, or to put it another way, ‘we all partied’ (cited in Kerrigan 2012). McCullagh 
(2010) similarly quotes this ‘discursive fight back’ by the power elite to the extent 
that Minister Lenihan’s somewhat defensive remark, ‘quickly found favour with the 
business sector’ (p. 45) and even came to pass as ‘common-sense’. As stated by the 
recipient of the 2008 Business Person of the Year Award, Gary McCann: ‘we all share 
part of the responsibility for the position we are in’ (p. 46). As far as leading 
government ministers and their allies were concerned, ‘we’ were all culpable and 
should share in the shame of this self-inflicted catastrophe. And, as would become 
painfully obvious as time progressed, ‘we’ should all share the costs of absorbing the 
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banks’ toxic debts and reimbursing, among others, holders of unsecured bonds. 
Multi-billion Euro bank debts quickly became ‘our debts’ – an ‘obligation’ that had 
to be ‘honoured’ as a matter of ‘national pride’ and ‘reputation’ (sic), with such 
reasoning resonating well with EU leaders (McCarthy 2012). Although recycled by 
various actors, this narrative, or responsibility frame, began to wear thin in Ireland 
by 2012 with the new Prime Minister, Enda Kenny, stating during a rare televised 
state of the nation address that ‘you were not to blame’ for the crisis. Yet, a few 
weeks later, while addressing an international audience at Davos, he reverted to the 
previous position of democratising blame by informing world leaders and 
representatives of capital that  the Irish people ‘all went a bit mad with borrowing’ 
(Independent.ie 2012).ii  
 
The doctrine that we were all to blame found various forms of expression, but one of 
the most convenient was the myth of a lust for property that was specific to the Irish. 
This notion of an Irish ‘property-owning gene’ rested on claims that the rate of home 
ownership is higher in Ireland than in other European countries – a view 
contradicted by any long-term comparison with European averages. In 2006, at the 
peak of the boom, home ownership in Ireland stood at 76 per cent, putting Ireland at 
16th in ‘home-ownership’ levels, out of the 27 nations listed by Eurostat (cited in 
McCabe 2010). However, divergences at particular points in time (such as in 1991, 
when levels of home ownership were unusually high before increases in the cost of 
housing far outstripped minimal growth in the average industrial wage) were 
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considered enough to substantiate claims that the Irish were less content to rent 
property than people on the continent, that the Irish were simply obsessed with 
owning their own homes. This explanation was sometimes expressed in pop-
psychology terms. McWilliams (2007: 109-10) for instance, suggests that ‘[n]o-one 
who has seen Irish people queuing up to buy second and third homes can suggest 
that what they have seen is rational’. As far as McWilliams was concerned the Irish, 
including those desperately trying to get onto the property ladder, had acted 
irrationally and were suffering the consequences.  
 
The problem with this and other expressions of the responsibility frame is that they 
obscure the extent to which the property bubble was a direct result of government 
housing policy, which, as McCabe (2011) demonstrates, often served as a system of 
state subsidisation for the property and banking sectors. For McCabe, this sorry 
affair offers a clear lesson in class power. Such a view accords with our CR 
understanding of Irish society where hegemonic frames reflect and aim to reproduce 
the relatively enduring interests of the moneyed class. The democratisation of blame 
also rationalised calls for the state to ‘tackle’ various ‘sacred cows’ such as social 
welfare for mothers, the elderly and the sick (McCullagh 2010: 50), alongside the 
denigration of other specific scapegoats such as public sector workers. 
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‘Inefficient’ Public Sector Workers 
There is a common theme running through the government justifications for post-
boom cuts: once a target is identified, members of the government ‘convince’ 
themselves, and seek to convince others, that this particular group is benefiting at 
the expense of the entire country. As with past crises, Ireland’s economic crash 
represented and continues to represent an opportunity to attack unions, to divide 
workers and to undermine their pay and conditions: a well-rehearsed case of ‘never 
letting a crisis go to waste’ as observed more generally with the proliferation of 
neoliberal doctrines, or what Klein (2007) terms ‘disaster capitalism’. In this respect 
the government and mainstream media attempted to create the impression that 
Ireland was uncompetitive internationally, and that wages would have to be 
reduced (Kelly 2012). Because public sector workers are largely unionised, they are 
usually more inclined to defend their pay and conditions than workers in the private 
sector (Turner 2013). The gains realised through collective bargaining on the part of 
public sector workers represent a benchmark for private sector workers. As such the 
former represent a ready-made target for capital, to be isolated from other workers 
wherever the opportunity presents itself, and then disciplined as necessary.   
 
In 2009 the Special Group on Public Service Numbers and Expenditure Programmes 
was established by Finance Minister Brian Lenihan. The group sought to examine 
the expenditure programmes in each Government Department (Department of 
Finance 2013). Headed by a well-known Irish economist, Colm McCarthy, it 
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recommended significant cuts in public expenditure, including reducing the size of 
the public sector. The report ‘rationalised’ cuts, but was only a small part in the 
overall process. Accordingly, it is worth examining how attacks on the public sector 
were sold to the public in general.  
 
Just as the Irish public were ‘framed’ in a retrospective sense as responsible for the 
borrowing or ‘partying’ that crashed the nation, we would argue the same process 
was evident in how politicians sought to cut public expenditure in the name of 
ensuring recovery and future prosperity. And, as always, the Irish media played its 
part. In examining representations of the public service in Ireland’s print media we 
see clear evidence of the conflict and responsibility frames. Using a frame analysis 
approach, Murphy (2010) critically examines the representation of public service 
workers in the Irish Independent newspaper prior to the December 2009 budget. His 
research clearly documents a representation that was ‘symbiotic and reflective of the 
dominant discourse of government, business and employer elites that sought to shift 
the burden created by the casino capitalism of the free market onto ordinary 
workers’ (p. 3). This process entailed efforts to alienate or ‘Other’ this particular 
group in the minds of the general public, through representations which consistently 
portrayed an ‘unpatriotic, privileged, inefficient, militant, self-serving public sector 
worker in contrast with a taxpaying, pension paying, efficient, long-suffering private 
sector worker’ (p. 10). Week after week a ‘public versus private’ dichotomy was 
maintained. The effect of this language was to create an image of public sector 
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workers as a burden - a group of people existing at the expense of private sector 
workers and the population as a whole. The research also documents a process of 
‘drip feeding future policy decisions in attempts to gauge public reaction’, and 
‘reduce the “shock and awe” effect’ before implementing unpopular policies (p. 18).  
 
Similarly, Marron (2011) documents how the Irish Health Service Executive (HSE) 
and its employees have been constructed, with sensationalist headlines and 
inflammatory content depicting them as inefficient, incompetent, over-paid and 
privileged. A number of newspaper articles combine to portray the HSE and staff as 
‘grossly inept in their treatment of patients’ (Irish Independent 28 May 2011, cited in 
Marron 2012: 15). In essence, Marron documents a discourse in which the HSE is 
consistently identified as an organisation that must ‘radically change its operations’ 
reduce staff numbers and make ‘pay-bill savings’ (p. 10). Marron’s research 
illustrates how, ideologically, these frames seek a ‘consensus by consistently 
reiterating the idea that if ”they” were not paid as much, “we” would all have free GP 
care [an aspiration not even realised in Ireland during the boom] and economically 
the country could recover’ (p. 12). 
 
What the above evidences are systematic efforts to transfer culpability for 
deteriorating economic and social conditions to the putatively inefficient and 
parasitic public sector – an incredible inversion of reality, we would argue, given the 
unproductive nature of finance capital (Hudson 2010). Walby (2013) would likely 
underscore the gendered processes and inequities at play here since public sector 
jobs and services are disproportionately held and supported by women. 
Responsibility and conflict frames are not neutral either in class or gendered terms. 
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Welfare Recipients: From the Unemployed and Single Mothers to the Biggest ‘Welfare 
Queen’ of All  
In post-Celtic Tiger Ireland, the government has been directly and indirectly cutting 
social welfare, whilst also making it increasingly difficult for the unemployed to 
receive ongoing support for what some Labour ministers regard as a ‘lifestyle 
choice’ (see Taft 2014). Rather than conceding any failure on their part to develop the 
productive economy and meaningfully reduce unemployment (i.e. introduce policies 
that do not depend on mass emigration and widely condemned ‘training courses’), 
politicians along with the mass media construct claimants, notably young claimants 
amidst high youth unemployment, as lazy. Taft (2014) writes: ‘It’s bad enough to 
suffer cuts – in public services, income supports, job, wages. But then to be told that 
you are to blame . . . And then to be told that you are lazy, too‘.  
 
In further scapegoating ‘blameworthy’ and ‘lazy’ welfare recipients and justifying 
‘savings’, politicians and the media repeatedly sensationalize ‘social welfare fraud’. 
The people of Ireland are routinely exposed to television investigations by leading 
state and commercial stations, print media coverage, and vocal pronouncements 
from establishment politicians claiming that massive fraud is occurring. Ireland’s 
commercial TV3 station has been quite enthusiastic about this. Between 2011 and 
2013 the station repeatedly aired the same documentary on ‘dole cheats’ from the 
series Paul Connolly Investigates. The TV3 website description of the documentary 
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reads: ‘Paul takes a look at the rampant [sic] problem of social welfare fraud 
occurring in Ireland’ (TV3 Player 2013). Whether consciously intended or not, each 
time this was aired it helped further crystallize ‘common-sense’ responses to the 
crisis where  ever deeper cuts to social welfare appeared reasonable and something 
any ‘right minded’ person would expect. And, if claims of fraud and laziness were 
insufficient, other rationalisations helped to frame the regressive measures contained 
in the Social Welfare Bill of December 2012 as warranted, such as women’s 
‘immorality’ and/or ‘imprudence’.  
 
Such judgements were offered most enthusiastically by Fine Gael TD Derek Keating 
who decided to highlight single mothers who were framed as promiscuous, unwise 
in their choice of partners and abusing the system. With righteous indignation, 
Keating complained of ‘young women who find themselves caring, not for one child 
or two, but for three and four children by multiple fathers who are uncaring and 
failing in their duties of care and support with the consequences picked up by the 
taxpayer’ (cited in Browne 2012). These young women were apparently creating ‘a 
new lifestyle of welfare economy’ (ibid.). Keating’s sudden concern about single-
mothers’ claims on welfare could not have been prompted by any increase 
in occurrence of single-parent claimants, since the number of claimants had dropped 
from 92,326 in 2010 to 87,735 in 2012 (ibid.). In any case, as Browne elaborates: ‘60% 
(of claimants) have only one child, 28% have two children and the remaining circa 
12% come in the category of having three or more children — with many of these 
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families comprising women who are divorced or separated after their marriages 
broke down’. Of course, the strategy employed by Keating has a long history and is 
similarly witnessed in Britain (see Skeggs 2006, Tyler 2013). In fact it can be traced at 
least as far back as Thomas Malthus’ opposition to the Old Poor Law (abolished in 
1834), which depended on claims that the system was facilitating immorality, 
dependency, irresponsibility and feckless breeding (O’Flynn 2009: 98). 
 
When it comes to efforts to scapegoat vulnerable groups in contemporary Ireland, 
the political establishment typically prefers anecdotes over facts. This, of course, is in 
keeping with the previously noted secular, political definition of scapegoating that is 
shallow, widespread and aimed at a multitude of ‘transitory victims’ (Brown and 
Stivers 1998: 716). For example, in 2008, the Labour Party spokesperson on Social 
and Family Affairs, Roisin Shortall, said there was a need for greater vigilance 
against child benefit fraud by migrants, and called on the state to stop such 
payments abroad (Haynes et al. 2010). This was a staggering request given that the 
arrangement was provided for under EU law (O’Brien 2009). Likewise, in 2009 
Limerick County Councillor, Liam Galvin (Fine Gael) said that he believed that a 
considerable amount of fraud was being committed through the wrongful claiming 
of ‘welfare benefits’ by foreign nationals. He stated that ‘taxi drivers are picking up 
foreigners at the airport and driving them straight to the welfare office and straight 
back to the airport again’ (Limerick Leader 26 May, cited in Power et al. 2012: 13-14).iii 
Yet, Councillor Galvin’s assertions seem to ignore the fact that since 2004 all 
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applicants had to satisfy the Habitual Residence Condition (HRC) for a wide range 
of social welfare payments (Department of Social Protection 2010a, 2010b).iv    
 
Another common strategy to enhance frame resonance and the redirection of blame 
towards scapegoats is to highlight an extreme example of welfare abuse that people 
can easily visualise, and then extrapolate from the individual case to claims of 
welfare fraud on an industrial scale. For example, this approach was taken in 2011 as 
the government were planning to cut social welfare. Minister of State Fergus 
O’Dowd claimed that there was widespread fraud in the social welfare system, 
costing the state somewhere in the region of €600m (Taft 2011). Though the 
newspapers, state broadcasters and others uncritically repeated these assertions, the 
€600 million figure of welfare fraud was in reality a ‘control saving’. This means that 
‘if there were no controls or inspections’, there would be a guesstimated ‘€600 
million in over-payments over time, but crucially fraud would only account for a 
minority of these over-payments’ (Taft 2011). As Taft elaborates, fraud was actually 
accounted for at a rate of ‘€21 million in 2007, rising to €26 million by 2010’, figures 
which are approximately 0.1 per cent of the Department of Social Protections’ 
budget. However, publicizing these figures would not fit with the hegemonic anti-
welfare agenda qua ‘responsibility’ frame; thus, we concur with Taft’s assertion that 
‘to talk of €600 million in fraud is highly fraudulent’. Yet, crucially, the extent to 
which these discourses have taken hold among the general public - the degree to 
which they resonate with pre-existing prejudices and dominant ideology - has meant 
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that cuts to welfare tend not to appear as attacks on the most vulnerable. Rather, 
they are framed as a means of tackling the putative abuse of the system and the 
irresponsibility of feckless groups that cannot and should not be tolerated in a time 
of austerity. As an aside, we recognise that such framing is also evidenced in Britain 
with intensified political rhetoric about ‘the welfare scrounger/skiver’ and attendant 
media ‘poverty porn’ which constructs ‘figures of disgust’ (Jensen 2014).  
 
Of course, the media not only target the poor and vulnerable. Because the finance, 
insurance and real estate (FIRE) sector is the largest recipient of state handouts – it is 
the biggest ‘welfare queen’, so to speak, following a historically unprecedented 
bailout – ‘banker bashing’ is also apparent and it has considerable resonance. Yet, we 
recognise the limitations of ‘banker bashing’ not least because it is individualising 
and de-politicising. It is a means of disseminating the enabling myth of a few rotten 
worms in an otherwise healthy green apple (Žižek 2009), irrespective of the fact that 
rotten worms are not required for a socially destructive speculative frenzy to 
develop. Indeed, we would highlight the inadequacy of ‘banker bashing’ by noting 
how those facilitating the bail-out of the financial sector are among the most eager to 
participate in the practice. German Chancellor Angela Merkel, for example, recently 
expressed ‘outrage’ on hearing the Anglo tapes (a series of taped conversations 
between senior executives at Anglo Irish Bank, made public in June 2013) (Sherrard 
2013). The tapes suggest that bankers planned to load the Irish state with billions of 
Euros worth of private debt, requiring necessary deceptions of politicians and 
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central bank officials. The fact that ‘banker bashing’ is an individualising and de-
politicising reaction to the crisis permitted Merkel to express moral indignation and 
apparent outrage at the callous attitude toward the European taxpayer, while at the 
same time presiding over the bailout of European banks at public expense. Likewise, 
Ireland’s Deputy Prime Minister, Eamon Gilmore, said the tapes were ‘disgusting’, 
that they showed the ‘arrogance’, ‘contempt’ and ‘sheer greed’ of senior executives 
at Anglo Irish Bank (thejournal.ie 2013). However, apart from the flippant and 
offensive tone of the tapes, Gilmore did not condemn the bankers’ economic 
interests (the socialisation of massive private debts) as ‘disgusting’. In fact Gilmore 
expressed relief that the Anglo tapes had not emerged earlier, since they might have 
jeopardised the Irish government’s debt-deal negotiations with European authorities 
- the same negotiations that have burdened current and future generations with 
paying off Anglo’s debt to European banks and private bondholders (WNS Reporter 
2013). Sociologists such as McCullagh (2014) aptly locate such processes within a 
larger welfare state for the rich, which entails the large vertical redistribution of 
resources from the bottom and middle to the top. 
 
In the end, the process of scapegoating described above serves a dual-purpose: on 
the one hand it deflects blame from the government and the relatively enduring class 
interests that it is prioritising; on the other hand it serves to rationalise and 
normalise attacks on those that it has been decided must bear the costs. The process 
is entwined with the transference of privately accumulated debt as part of a 
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moralised as well as economic class project that is inseparable from other 
intersecting axes of power (notably gender and ethnicity). We argue that the more 
obvious the damage wrought by the financial firms, property developers and 
speculators, and the more obvious the source of deteriorating conditions, the greater 
the attempts to transfer the burden of blame to groups lower down the social 
structure wherein inequalities and inequity are most acutely experienced. More 
generally, we would suggest these are the logics and patterned consequences of a 
capitalist system in structural crisis. This is a world-system where powerful interests 
are threatened by a bifurcating system, resulting in renewed efforts to defend deeply 
structured privileges (Wallerstein 1999, 2011). 
 
Concluding Reflections 
Concerns have been expressed that mainstream sociology has, over the past five 
decades, largely neglected capital, capitalism and the economy, resulting in much 
myopia and even blindness (Lenzer 2007). Yet, as evidenced by this special issue of 
Sociology and various movements within the BSA, sociology, in line with its classical 
heritage, has much to offer. Accordingly, we share the view that our discipline must 
become more engaging in this time of crisis and austerity - or what Scambler (2012) 
terms ‘unjust times’ (see also Burawoy 2005, Tyler 2013). Hopefully, our modest 
contribution to the discussion, from the periphery of Western Europe, provides 
additional grist to such debates and further stimulates the sociological imagination. 
To that end, we reflected on the process of scapegoating in post-Celtic Tiger Ireland, 
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ranging from democratised discourses (everybody is to blame) to the vilification of 
more specific targets such as ‘welfare cheats’ (e.g. single mothers and immigrants). 
While superficial, such processes nonetheless have the potential to foster much 
intolerance and hatred under conditions of (unresolved) crisis (Wallerstein 2011).  
 
Whether understood anthropologically or sociologically, scapegoating is a multi-
faceted social process. As observed, secular/political forms of scapegoating in 
Ireland, reproduced through and amplified by a neoliberal mass media (Mercille 
2013), are inseparable from and are indeed exacerbated by deteriorating material 
conditions of existence. Sharing critical realist concerns with ontological matters (e.g. 
real social structures, class as a generative mechanism) and drawing insights from 
group conflict theory, frame analysis and a political economy critique of the global 
crisis, we aimed to make sense of what is in many respects utterly senseless and 
unnecessary for those who dare imagine a more just and equal society. For Allen 
(2009: 113), post-crash Ireland is a ‘mad, mad world’ where all manner of inequities 
are institutionalised and myths prevail. Monaghan and O’Flynn (2013) would refer 
to this as a Madoffized society, given the corrosive consequences of ponzi finance.   
 
Whether Ireland is considered ‘mad’ or Madoffized, this is also a nation that is 
socially structured according to discernible, relatively enduring interests and the 
exercise of power within and between nations. We would argue, at least in the 
context of the EU, that Ireland is disproportionately bearing the economic and social 
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costs of the structural crisis of historical capitalism – a crisis that preoccupied 
exceptional sociologists, such as Wallerstein (1999), well before the 2008 GFC. These 
are the conditions where socially structured interests and competition over resources 
prevail, providing fertile terrain for scapegoating. The above also fits a historical 
pattern of inequitable inter-state relations, racism and the denigration of 
subordinated European states as administered by ruling elites. Provocatively, given 
Ireland’s history of colonial oppression by the British Empire and the denigration of 
the Irish as ‘white niggers’, O’Keeffe (2013) has (with a nod in the direction of 
Malcolm X) compared the nation’s elite to ‘house-negroes’, who find favour with 
their master at the expense of ‘field negroes’ toiling as slaves. And, just as ‘nigger’ 
has been defined as ‘the master symbol of outsider to the community’ in a process of 
scapegoating that also implicates place (Brown and Stivers 1998: 713), there are times 
when Ireland (with its putatively feckless population) is constructed as a scapegoat 
for ‘the European community’ where wrongs now have to be put right. Of course, it 
is not alone; rather, it sits alongside the rest of the deprecated PIIGS (Portugal, Italy, 
Greece and Spain), which remain in crisis and in need of disciplining by the markets.         
 
One key conclusion is that scapegoating in Ireland cannot be understood in isolation 
from the socially destructive character of global finance capital, or from the power-
relations ensuring that particular interests are preserved/consolidated/extended in 
the event of economic collapse. In Ireland, the process has to be set against the 
knowledge that the FIRE sector’s interests have been prioritised above all other 
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considerations (such as social/gender justice), representing perhaps in exaggerated 
form how the power of nation states (in the case of the Eurozone, powerful core 
nations such as Germany) underpin the monetary system where commercial banks 
rather than society are purportedly ‘too big to fail’. It is of course difficult to publicly 
rationalise policies that have highly negative effects typically on the most vulnerable 
in society, particularly since the destructive character of the FIRE sector has been so 
fully exposed. Yet, such narrow interests prevail. Because there are incredible social 
costs to this, heavy symbolic machinery and capital continue to be deployed to 
deflect blame from those groups who profit most from capitalism’s exploitative 
modes of reproduction – an unfortunate yet sociologically interesting twist on group 
conflict theory that has hitherto largely focused on the degradation of small minority 
groups rather than larger populations (including entire odiously indebted nations). 
As such, we would posit that the politics of austerity and scapegoating are two sides 
of the same coin. 
 
In sum, we believe Ireland’s crisis offers a valuable case study on the processes of 
ideological rationalisation that have become especially acute post-2008, making clear 
that as financial, economic and fiscal crises unfold, scapegoating becomes a 
convenient and pervasive process in response to the ills of a polarising world-
system. With the exception of a few ‘rotten’ bankers, it is the unemployed, single 
mothers, public sector workers and immigrants in Ireland who are the ‘logical’ 
targets for routine pillorying. However, rather than claiming Ireland is peculiar, it is 
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our view that Ireland offers a lens on the pervasive process of scapegoating and its 
role in the crisis as it affects populations across the world. Ireland serves as a 
cautionary tale - an example of the power and dominance of fictitious capital and of 
the ideological means by which its oppressive ends are currently facilitated. It is our 
hope that broader recognition of such processes will help to move debates away 
from how to politically administer austerity to more substantively rational concerns 
about the sort of world we wish to share. Sociology, in line with its classic heritage, 
is well-placed to rise to this challenge and assert its relevance in a world where the 
‘logics’ of the market rather than civil society currently prevail.   
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i In that regard, patterns of corporate take-over appear to be writ large at the sovereign level 
and this does not bode well for Ireland’s future. We would be remiss here if we did not 
mention there is a historical record of workers’ savings, via ‘pension-fund’ or ‘money 
manager capitalism’, being appropriated and used to attack labour and industrial capital 
through corporate looting and asset stripping (Hudson 2010: 439). 
ii Such U-turns were not peculiar to Ireland. For example, while still in office, former French 
President, Nicolas Sarkozy (cited in Allen 2011: 171), argued that ‘the idea of the absolute 
power of the markets that should not be constrained by any rule, by any political 
intervention, was a mad idea. The idea that the markets were always right was a mad idea’. 
Yet within a few months of such statements the move to resurrect the systems which had 
caused the GFC was underway in earnest throughout the EU. 
iii  See Haynes at al. (2010) for a fuller discussion on how Irish politicians constructed 
Transnational EU migrants in Ireland between 2008 and 2010.  
iv As a result of the EU enlargement on 1 May 2004 Ireland and two other EU15 countries 
permitted open access to their workforce for new EU members. As a precaution against 
‘welfare tourism’, from those countries, on that day, Ireland introduced the Habitual 
Residence Condition (HRC) as an additional criterion for eligibility for social assistance 
payments. According to the HRC a person is not habitually resident unless the person has 
been present in the State for a continuous period of two years (Department of Social 
Protection 2010a and 2010b). While the legislation has been in place since 2004, it was only 
with the onset of the GFC that a populist discourse of a need for greater vigilance against 
welfare fraud by migrants emerged.  
